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ECONOMIC CONTROLS: EXECUTIVE POWER AND THE
DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY
INTRODUCTION
On August 15, 1971, the President of the United States inaugurated
what has become popularly known as the "1971 Wage-Price Freeze". The
"Freeze" is basically a ninety day moratorium on wages, prices, rents and
salaries which hopefully will stabilize the U.S. economy, presently
plagued by inflation, unemployment and a balance of payments deficit.
The President's action was a dramatic one to most Americans, evoking a
wide spectrum of response ranging from hearty approbation to discon-
solate dismay. Naturally, much discussion is aimed at the practical
economic wisdom of the action. Another question, however, often ini-
tially appears. If only for a fleeting moment, citizens wonder where the
President got the authority to declare the freeze. Most then assume that
it must be legal, and some others realize that he was empowered to do so
by the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970.1 Notwithstanding the Stabili-
zation Act, as the nation experiences an economy largely under Executive
Control, it is now appropriate to survey the legal doctrines concerning the
inherent domestic powers of the President and the supposed "non-deleg-
ability" of Congressional law-making authority. The Stabilization Act
provides only the barest skeleton upon which the President can build his
program of wage and price control. The whole situation provides an
opportunity for a hopefully informative and thought provoking review
of the President's proper role in domestic affairs, especially those
touching upon national economic control and planning. The point of
this discussion will be first to study the limited "inherent" domestic
Presidential powers, and then to go on to the more relevant issue of
Congressional power delegated to the Chief Executive. Before doing that,
however, it might be helpful to take a brief look at the Stabilization Act
itself, and the President's subsequent actions.
The Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 provides in part:
The President is authorized to issue such orders and regulations as
he may deem appropriate to stabilize prices, rents, wages, and salaries
at levels not less than those prevailing on May 25, 1970. Such orders
and regulations may provide for the making of such adjustments as
may be necessary to prevent gross inequities.
... The authority conferred on the President by this section shall
not be exercised with respect to a particular industry or segment of the
economy unless the President determines, after taking into account the
seasonal nature of employment, the rate of employment or under-
employment, and other mitigating factors, that prices or wages in that
industry or segment of the economy have increased at a rate which
is grossly disproportionate to the rate at which prices or wages have
increased in the economy generally.2
1. Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, P.L. 91-379, as amended P.L. 91-558, P.L. 92-8,
84 Stat. 709 (1970). 12 U.S.C.A. §1904 (note) (1971 Cum. Supp., p. 53).
2. Id. §202.
The remainder of the Act provides for Executive delegation of the given
authority;3 for fines of $5,000 in the event of willful violation of orders
and regulation; 4 and, for injunctive relief to the government to restrain
past, present or prospective violations.5 The President's authority to act
under this title expires April 30, 1972.0
Thus empowered, the President issued Executive Order No. 11615 of
August 15, 19711 providing for the stabilization of prices, rents, wages
and salaries. Acting pursuant to "authority vested in . . . [him] . . . by
the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including the Economic
Stabilization Act of 1970 . . . as amended . . .,, the President ordered
that:
Prices, rents, wages, and salaries shall be stabilized for a period of
90 days from the date hereof at levels not greater than the highest of
those pertaining to a substantial volume of actual transactions by each
individual, business, firm or other entity of any kind during the 30-day
period ending August 14, 1971, for like or similar commodities or
services. If no transactions occurred in that period, the ceiling will be
the highest price, rent, salary or wage in the nearest preceding 30-day
periodin which transactions did occur. No person shall charge, assess,
or receive, directly or indirectly in any transaction prices or rents in
any form higher than those permitted hereunder, and no person shall,
directly or indirectly, pay or agree to pay in any transaction wages or
salaries in any form, or to use any means to obtain payment of wages
and salaries in any form, higher than those permitted hereunder,
whether by retroactive increase or otherwise.
. . . Each person engaged in the business of selling or providing
commodities or services shall maintain available for public inspection
a record of the highest prices or rents charged for such or similar
commodities or services during the 30-day period ending August 14,
1971.
t . . The provisions of section 1 and 2 hereof shall not apply to
the prices charged for raw agricultural products.9
To implement this program, the President also created the Cost of Living
Council, 10 and vested it with all the Presidential powers granted by the
Stabilization Act.11 The Council was further authorized to re-delegate
its authority 12 to issue orders and regulations,13 and "take such other
actions as it determines to be necessary and appropriate to carry out
the purposes of this order."' 14 The Cost of Living Council, through sev-
eral Executive agencies, is now administering the "Wage-Price Freeze";
and for the purposes of this discussion the structure for administration
will not be further considered. Mindful of the content of both the
Economic Stabilization Act and Executive Order No. 11615, attention











14. Id. §4(a)(it).14. Id. § 4(a)(Ov).-
power and the delegability of Congressional law-making authority.
INHERENT DOMESTIC POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT
The basic inherent powers of the President of the United States are
set out in Article II of the Constitution. Clause 1, Sec. 1 of Article II
states "The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America." Section 2 designates the President as ". . . Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia
of the several States .... " That same section later grants the President
the ". . . Power, by and with the Advise and Consent of the Senate, to
make treaties, providing two thirds of the Senators present concur ... "
The last clause of Section 3 charges the President with taking care
"... that the Laws be faithfully executed ...... The balance of Article
II imposes upon the President authority and specific limitations in regard
to the appointment of executive and diplomatic officers, appointment of
Justices of the Supreme Court, filling Senate vacancies, calling special
meetings of Congress, recommending legislation and vetoing Acts of
Congress. In scrutinizing any official act of the President, its validity
depends upon its being either an exercise of the true Article II "Execu-
tive Powers" of the President or the exercise of powers properly given
the President by Congress. In the words of one commentator:
In so far as any broad claims of presidential prerogative rest upon the
language of the Constitution and find support in a delegated power
theory, they must be derived from the clauses vesting the executive.
authority in him, constituting him the head of the armed forces (and
imposing on him the duty to enforce the laws). Such a claim must
also be viewed in the light of the first section of Article I which vests
in the Congress all the legislative powers delegated to the federal
government under the Constitution.15
As conceptually straightforward and appealing as the above analysis
might be, the question of what is the actual content of the true "Execu-
tive Power" in any given fact situation may be far more conplicated.
The Federal Convention determined' 6 that "The Executive Power of
the United States shall be vested in a single person . . . ,"17 and that
"His stile shall be 'The President of the United States of America'....,18
The real question to be raised in connection with the "Executive Powers"
granted to the President was whether that phrase was merely a general
description of the specific powers enumerated throughout Article II, in
contrast to the possibility that the Article II, clause 1 statement, that
"the Executive Power shall be vested in a President . .. ," was in and of
itself a greater general grant of all the executive power of the sovereign
15. Kauper, The Steel Seizure case: Congress. the President and the Supreme Court, 51
Mich. L. Rev. 141. 144 (1952) (hereinafter cited as Kauper).
16. The Constitution of the United States. Analysis and Interpretation. Annotations of Cases
Decided by the Supreme Court of the United States to June 22, 1964, prepared by the
Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, S. Doc. No. 39, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 426 (1964) (hereinafter cited as Annotations).
17. M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention. 185 (1st ed. 1911) (quoting from
a Report of the Committee of Detail to the Convention, August 6, 1787).
18. Id.
United States. Alexander Hamilton in defending Washington's Proclama-
tion of Impartiality in the context of the war between France and Britain
concisely defended the proposition that the Constitution granted the
President the general overall sovereign executive Power of the United
States:
The second article of the Constitution of the United States, section
first, establishes his general proposition, that "the Executive Power
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." The
same article, in a succeeding section, proceeds to delineate particular
cases of executive power. It declares, among other things, that the
president shall be commander in chief of the army and navy of the
United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called
into the actual service of the United States; that he shall have power,
by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to make treaties;
that it shall be his duty to receive ambassadors and other public
ministers, and to take care that the laws he faithfully executed. It
would not consist with the rules of sound construction, to consider
this enumeration of particular authorities as derogating from-the more
comprehensive grant in the general clause, further than as it may be
coupled with express restrictions or limitations;-as in regard to the
co-operation of the senate in the appointment of officers, and the
making of treaties; which are plainly qualifications of the general
executive powers of appointing officers and making treaties. The diffi-
culty of a complete enumeration of all the cases of executive au-
thority, would naturally dictate the use of general terms, and would
render it improbable that a specification of certain particulars was de-
signed as a substitute for those terms, when antecedently used. The
different mode of expression employed in the constitution, in regard
to the two powers, the legislative and the executive, serves to confirm
this inference. In the article which gives the legislative powers of the
government, the expressions are, "All legislative powers herein
granted shall be vested in a congress of the United States." In that
which grants the executive power, the expressions are, "The executive
power shall be vested in a President of the United States." The enum-
eration ought therefore to be considered,as intended merely to specify
the principal articles implied in the definition of executive power;
leaving the rest to flow from the general grant of that power, in-
terpreted in conformity with other parts of the Constitution, and with
the principles of free government. The general doctrine of our Con-
stitution then is, that the executive power of the nation is vested in
the President; subject only to the exceptions and qualifications, which
are expressed in the instrument.19
In accord with the broad sweep of Hamilton's thought, various Presi-
dents have taken executive action in ways which precluded judicial re-
view. 20 Until 1952 and the Youngstown Sheet and Tube21 litigation, the
authoritative cases dealing with Presidential exercise of "Executive
Powers" only hit upon limited employments of those powers in narrow
areas of the question. There had been no panoramic surveys of executive
authority, nor had there been much litigation in the almost untouched
19. Annotations. supra note 2, at 427 (citing 7 Works of Alexander Hamilton 76, 80-1
(J.C. Hamilton ed. 1851) and noting that Hamilton was interpreting the executive
power clause in light of the views of Blackstone. Locke and Montesquieu as to the
location of power in the conduct of foreign affairs).
20. See discussion in Chief Justice Vinson's dissenting opinion, Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 683-700 (1952).
21. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
theatre of questions involving the. Presidential prerogative in domestic
affairs. 22 Before reaching Youngstown Sheet and Tube a review of these
previous cases might help flesh-out the judicial doctrine until then.
The first important judicial pronouncement came in the Civil War
"Prize Cases"23 testing the parameters of the President's Executive Powers
as Commander in Chief of the nation's armed forces. Four ships had been
seized pursuant to President Lincoln's April 1861 executive order declar-
ing a blockade of Confederate ports. A federal court order condemned
the ships and the owners appealed. In a 5:4 decision the Supreme Court
sustained the seizure of three of the four vessels. In answer to the
question "Had the President a right to institute a blockade of ports in
possession of persons in armed rebellion against the Government, on the
principles of international law, as known and acknowledged among
civilized States . . . ,",24 Justice Grier speaking for the majority stated:
"A civil war is never solemnly declared; it becomes such by its accidents-
the number, power, and organization of the persons who originate and
carry it on."2 5 He further stated:
By the Constitution, Congress alone has the power to declare a
national or foreign war. It cannot declare war against a State, or any
number of States, by virtue of any- clause in the Constitution. The Con-
stitution confers on the President the whole Executive power. He is
bound to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. He is Com-
mander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of
the militia of the several States when called into the actual service
of the United States. He has no power to initiate or declare a war
either against a foreign nation or a domestic State. But by the Acts
of Congress of February 28th, 1795, and 3d of March, 1807, he is
authorized to call out the militia and use the military and naval
forces of the United States in case of invasion by foreign nations,
and to suppress insurrection against the government of a State or of
the United States.
2 6
The Court went on to uphold the blockade and find that in suppressing
the insurrection it was up to the President to determine whether he met
such resistance as to make it proper to designate those involved as bellig-
erents within the meaning of international law. ". . . This court must be
governed by the decisions and acts of the political department of the
Government to which this power was entrusted. . . .The proclamation
of blockade is itself official and conclusive evidence to the Court that a
state of war existed which demanded and authorized a recourse to such
a measure, under the circumstances peculiar to the case."' 27 Here the
Court upheld the right of the President in exercise of his Executive
Powers to treat certain states of the Union as belligerents in a situation
which basically was a national internal political struggle before Congress
had specifically* so authorized him. The situation was, however, a dis-
tinctively military one and the impact of the decision is blunted by ref-
22. Kauper. supra note 1 at 142.
23. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1862).
24. 67 U.S. at 665.
25. Id. at 666.
26. Id. at 668.
27. Id. at 670.
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erences to less specific Congressional authorizations to employ the armed
forces of the United States in cases of invasion or insurrection against the
United States.
The second case of interest also grew out of the Civil War and
questioned whether the impressment into Union service of several steam-
ers amounted to an "appropriation" of property for which the U.S. Court
of Claims was the appropriate forum in which to seek remuneration. The
precise holding is not important to the present inquiry but some of the
Court's language has been considered to be a comment on the Executive
Powers of the Federal Government in times of grave public danger as
well as war:
Private property, the Constitution provides, shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation, and it is clear that there are few
safeguards ordained in the fundamental law against oppression and
the exercise of arbitrary power of more ancient origin or of greater
value to the citizen, as the provision for compensation, except in
certain extreme cases, is a condition precedent annexed to the right of
the government to deprive the owner of his property without his con-
sent. Extraordinary and unforeseen occasions arise, however, beyond
all doubt, in cases of extreme necessity in time of war or of immediate
and impending public danger, in which private property may be im-
pressed into the public service, or may be seized and appropriated to
the public use, or may even be destroyed without the consent of the
owner. Unquestionably such extreme cases may arise, as where the
property taken is imperatively necessary in time of war. ....
Where such an extraordinary and unforeseen emergency occurs in the
public service in time of war no doubt is entertained that the power
of the government is ample to supply for the moment the public wants
in that way to the extent of the immediate public exigency, but the
public danger must be immediate, imminent, and impending, and the
emergency in the public service must be extreme and imperative, and
such as will not admit of delay or a resort to any other source of
supply, and the circumstances must be such as imperatively require
the exercise of that extreme power in respect to the particular prop-
erty so impressed, appropriated, or destroyed. Exigencies of the kind
do arise in time of war or impending public danger, but it is the
emergency, as was said by a great magistrate, that gives the right, and
it is clear that the emergency must be shown to exist before the
taking can be justified.28
Much of what was said was dicta in context of the Russell case, but
indicated a judicial humour not completely unreceptive to the proposition
that certain far reaching powers lay in the hands of the President as the
chief executing officer of the inherent powers of the Federal Government.
In 1890, the Supreme Court heard the case of In Re Neagle29 up-
holding the release of a U.S. Marshall on a federal writ of habeas corpus.
The U.S. Marshall had killed a man while acting as bodygurd of Justice
Field of the Supreme Court as he conducted his duties as Circuit Justice
for the 9th Circuit in California. The basic question was whether the
Marshall was acting pursuant to the laws of the United States in acting as
28. United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. 623, 627-8 (1871).
29. 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
Justice Field's bodyguard and thereby entitled to seek a writ of habeas
corpus securing his release from a California Sheriff holding him on a
charge of murder. The U.S. Marshall had been appointed by the U.S.
Attorney General to protect Justice Field. The Court held that the U.S.
Statute giving circuit courts power to issue writs of habeas corpus on
petition of a person alleged to be in custody "for an act done or omitted
in pursuance of a law of the United States . . ." did not require that the
law be by express act of Congress. Any obligation fairly and properly
inferable from the Constitution, or any duty of a United States officer
to be derived from the general scope of his duties under the laws of the
United States, was a "law" within the meaning of the statute. Under the
U.S. Constitution, Article 2, §3 declaring that the President of the United
States "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," the Presi-
dent has the power, through the Attorney General, to direct a U.S.
Marshall to protect a U.S. Justice in pursuit of his official duties. This
case seemingly points up the question of the President's inherent power
to attend to the "faithful execution" of the "laws" on the domestic scene
outside of his military or international powers and without the express
direction of Congress. The potential influence of this case was however
somewhat reduced by a late reference by the majority to section 788 of
the then U.S. Revised Statutes which gave the U.S. Marshall the same
powers in each state, in executing the laws of the United States, as the
sheriffs have by law in executing the state laws. The Court then noted
that the California law provided that the sheriffs shall preserve the peace
and declared that homicide was justifiable when committed in resisting
an attempt to murder any person. The Court was unwilling to let the
decision stand without some reference to at least partial Congressional
approval of the Marshall's action on behalf of the Executive.
Another controversy gauging the Executive's powers in domestic af-
fairs was In Re Debs.3 0 The setting was the famous Pullman Car Strike
of 1894 wherein Debs and other officers of the American Railway Union
were boycotting the Pullman Palace Car Company by striking railway
lines using the Pullman Cars. Debs was before the Supreme Court
appealing a lower court contempt citation for failing to call off the
strike. The argument was made that Federal Courts were without power
to enjoin interference with interstate commerce because Congress had
not specifically so provided. The argument was also made by the gov-
ernment, that the President, aside from any Congressional grant, had the
power to remove serious obstructions to interstate commerce in the public
interest. The Court largely depended upon the first argument in coming
to decision holding that while it may be competent for the government,
through the executive branch and in the use of the entire executive power
of the Nation, to forcibly remove all such obstructions, it was equally
within its competency to appeal to the civil courts for an inquiry and
determination as to the existence and character of any of them, and if
30. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
such are found to exist or threaten to occur, to invoke the power of
the courts to remove or restrain them. The Court did not deny the pos-
sibly broad powers of the executive vis-a-vis interstate commerce, but it
was unwilling to explore the proposition beyond making such discussion
mere dicta in the case.
In United States v. Midwest Oil Company; 1' the Supreme Court up-
held the action of the President in withdrawing from theretofore au-
thorized citizens the right to explore and claim certain public lands for
the purpose of oil prospecting and development. All public lands con-
taining petroleum or other mineral oils had been declared by Congress
to be "free and open to occupation, exploration, and purchase by citi-
zens of the United States ...under regulations prescribed by law.."
: 2
As a result of very liberal policies concerning these rights of "occupa-
tion, exploration and purchase," the available lands were rapidly being
claimed and the U.S. Government was losing its rights to oil and
petroleum products which were becoming. increasingly more essential to
the functioh of the American Navy. Despite the general grant by
Congress to American citizens of the right to these oil claims, the
Supreme Court upheld the Executive Order 33 temporarily withdrawing
these rights because it found a long continued practice of the President,
acquiesced in by the Congress, to withdraw in the public interest, from
entry or location, public land that otherwise would have been open to
private acquisition created in the President an implied grant of power
to make the temporary withdrawal order as agent of the Congress in
aid of the administration of the public domain and in aid of probable
pending legislation. The court recognized that Congress held ultimate
responsibility for the management of public lands, but allowed the Presi-
dent to temporarily suspend a Congressional mandate concerning those
lands in accord with an established practice in the interests of the United
States.
Hamilton's enlarged conceptions of the executive power were seem-
ingly ratified by the Supreme Court in the 1926 Myers case.34 A post-
master was dismissed from his post by the Postmaster General, acting by
direction of the President. The case presented "the question whether
under the Constitution the President has the exclusive power of removing
executive officers of the United States whom he has appointed with the
advise and consent of the Senate. '" 35 A previous Act of Congress 3c re-
quired the consent of the Senate to removal by the President of post-
masters of the first, second and third classes. The Court held this Act
invalid, maintaining that the President, under Article II of the Constitu-
tion had sole power of removal. Speaking for the majority, Mr. Chief
31. 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
32. Act of February 11, 1897. ch. 216. 29 Stat. 526.
33. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 467 (1914) (citing text of
Proclamation of President Taft of September 27, 1909 entitled "Temporary Petroleum
Withdrawal No. 5").
34. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
35. Id. at 106.
36. Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 179, §6, 19 Stat. 80, as amended 39 U.S.C. §3311 (1962).
Justice Taft said:
The requirement of the second section of. Article II that the Senate
should advise and consent to the presidential appointments, was to be
strictly construed. The words of section 2, following the general grant
of executive power under section 1, were either an enumeration and
emphasis of specific functions of the executive, not all inclusive, or
were limitations upon the general grant of the executive power, and as
such, being limitations, should not be enlarged beyond the words used.
Madison, I Annals, 402, 463, 464. The executive power was given in
general terms, strengthened by specific terms where emphasis was
regarded as appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions where
limitation was needed, and the fact that no express limit was placed
on the power of removal by the executive was convincing indication
that none was intended. This is the same construction of article 2 as
that of Alexander Hamilton.... [supra page 9 ]37
This case is especially interesting to the present discussion because it in-
volved Presidential action in direct contravention of a Congressional
mandate, and the decision in the President's favor had to be squarely
based upon his inherent Article II powers.
A decade later the Court addressed itself to the question of the
President's role in international affairs.' Justice Sutherland speaking for
the Court in United States v. Curtiss-Wrigbt Corp.,3 8 upheld the validity
of A Joint Resolution of Congress39 empowering the President to pro-
hibit the sale of arms and munitions to certain South American nations
then in armed conflict if he finds that such embargo might "contribute
to the reestablishment of peace between those countries." In reaching
this decision the Court determined that the Joint Resolution was not an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the President. The
powers of the Federal government over internal and foreign affairs are
different in origin. The colonies never had foreign powers, and neither
did the states severally possess such powers. When the Union was formed,
the colonies granted to it power over domestic affairs. However, "[a] s a
result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies acting as
a unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed from the Crown not
to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in their collective and cor-
porate capacity as the United States of America."'40 Therefore, in the
international field the sovereignty of the United States is complete.
Furthermore, in international relations the President is the sole organ of
the Federal Government.4 1 Because of the usual delicacy of foreign opera-
tions, and because of the peculiar powers of the President in this area,
any Congressional legislation which is to be properly made effective in
the international field must allow the President a degree of freedom
and discretion not permitted in domestic affairs. The practical conclusion
to be drawn from this case is "that the constitutional objection to delega-
37. 272 U.S. at 118.
38. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
39. Act of May 28, 1934, ch. 365, 48 Stat. 811.
40. 299 U.S. at 316.
41. 299 U.S. at 319 (citing Marshall's argument of March 7, 1800 in the House of Repre-
sentatives, Annals, 6th Cong., col. 613).
tion of legislative power does not apply to a delegation by Congress to
the President of its 'cognate' powers in this field; that in short, the
merged powers of the two departments may be put at the President's
disposal whenever Congress so desires." '42
Youngstown Sheet and Tube
On April 8, 1952, President Truman issued Executive Order 1034043
directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate most of the
nation's steel mills. The Order offered no prior specific statutory au-
thorization, but rather the President promulgated the order "by virtue
of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief
of the armed forces of the United States. . . -44 Secretary of Commerce
Sawyer immediately issued possessory orders directing the presidents of
the seized corporations to serve as operating managers for the United
States. The presidents obeyed under protest and brought proceedings
against the Secretary praying for declaratory and injunctive relief. The
District Court granted the plaintiffs' motions for temporary injunctions, 4 5
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari 46 after the Court of Appeals
issued stay orders.47
The President issued the Order because the U.S. was locked in
"deadly combat with the forces of aggression in Korea." 48 A controversy
between the United Steel Workers of America, C.I.O., and the nation's
steel producers had not been settled by collective bargaining or through
the efforts of the Wage Stabilization Board, and consequently a strike
was scheduled for 12:01 a.m., April 1, 1952. 4 9 In the judgment of the
President "a work stoppage would immediately jeopardize and imperil
our national defense . . [and] . . . in order to assure the continued
availability of steel and steel products during the existing emergency, it
is necessary that the United States take possession of and operate the
plants, facilities, and other property of the said companies . .."50 The
next morning the President sent a message to Congress reporting his
action, conceding Congress's power to supersede his order.5 1 The Presi-
dent sent another special message to Congress twelve days later.52
Congress did not act on either of these occasions, and had not acted at
the time of the Supreme Court's review.53 In the District Court the gov-
ernment argued that the President in his action relied "upon a 'broad
residium of power' sometimes referred to as 'inherent' power under the
42. Annotations, supra note 2 at 380.
43. Exec. Order No. 10,340, 3 C.F.RL 65 (Supp. 1953).
44. Id. at 66.
45. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 103 F. Supp. 569 (1952).
46. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 937 (1952).
47. Sawyer v. United States Steel Co., 197 F.2d 582 (1952).
48. Exec. Order No. 10,340, 3 C.F.R. 65 (Supp. 1953).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 65-6.
51. 98 Cong. Rec. 3912 (1953).
52. 98 Cong. Rec. 4130 (1953).
53. Youngstown Sheet & Tube. 343 U.S. 579, 583 (1952) (hereinafter cited as Youngstown
Sheet & Tube).
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Constitution. '54 The Supreme Court noted the argument that a "strike
disrupting steel production for even a brief period would so endanger
the well-being and safety of the Nation that the President had 'inherent'
power to do what he had done-power 'supported by the Constitution, by
historical precedent, and by court decisions.' "55 Justice Black delivered
the Court's opinion, framing the pertainent question as: " [I] s the seizure
order within the constitutional power of the President?"
56
In approaching the problem, the Court first observed that the Presi-
dent was claiming no right to act as he did by virtue of any act of
Congress, and in the opinion of the Court "[t] he President's power,
if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or
from the Constitution itself."5 The alleged power not flowing from an
act of Congress, the Court then noted that:
... it is not claimed that express constitutional language grants this
power to the President. The contention is that presidential power
should be implied from the aggregate of his powers under the Con-
stitution. Particular reliance is placed on provisions in Article II
which say that "the executive Power shall be vested in a President
* * *"; that "he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed";
and that he "shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of
the United States." 58
The Court then went on to dispose of the various possible aspects of
expressed Executive Powers which in the aggregate would imply a Presi-
dential power to do what had been done. The Court held that the order
could not be upheld as an action of the Commander in Chief of the
nation's armed forces despite the expanding modern concept of "theatre
of war" and many authorities upholding the broad powers of military
commanders engaged in day to day fighting in a theatre of war. The
job of keeping labor disputes from stopping production the Court ob-
served, is one for the nation's legislators not its military leaders. The
order was held to be constitutionally invalid as an exercise of the
inherent executive power vested in the President. In the words of the
Court:
Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several con-
stitutional provisions that grant executive power to the President. In
the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that
the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a
lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking
process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing
of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor
equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to ex-
ecute. The first section of the first article says that "All legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States * * *" After granting many powers to the Congress, Article I
goes on to provide that Congress may "make all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
54. Youngstown Sheet 6 Tube v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569, 573 (1952).
55. Youngstown Sheet 6 Tube, supra, note 38 at 584.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 585.
58. Id. at 587.
Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Gov-
ernment of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof." 5 9
In answer to the proposition that the President was also taking care
"that the Laws be faithfully executed" Justice Black replied: "The Presi-
dent's order does not direct that a congressional policy be executed in
a manner prescribed by Congress--it directs that a presidential policy
be executed in a manner prescribed by the President."6 0 Having laid to
rest the major portion of the government's case the Court addressed the
last proposition offered by the government, namely, that other Presidents
without congressional authority had taken possession of private enter-
prises in attempting to settle labor disputes. Notwithstanding such past
situations the Court maintained that ". . . Congress has not thereby lost
its exclusive constitutional authority to make laws necessary and proper
to carry out the powers vested by the Constitution 'in the Government
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.'-61
In brief summary of the Youngstown case, several points are im-
portant. There was no statute expressly or impliedly authorizing the
President to seize the property involved. Authority for the Presidential
action was not discernible in the "aggregate" of Executive Powers granted
the President by Article II, nor was the President properly acting pur-
suant to his "war powers" as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.
The power the President was attempting to exercise was the law making
power, a power vested in Congress alone. Even if Congress had quietly
allowed other Presidents to take possession of this power in the context
of other labor disputes this fact in no way divested Congress of its exclu-
sive authority to make the laws for the United States and all officers
thereof.
There was a strong dissent to the posture assumed by the majority.
Chief Justice Vinson conducted an exhaustive survey of past seizures and
assumptions of power by Presidents in the face of national emergencies
and concluded that what President Truman had done basically had been
surpassed by previous Presidents and the present action was by no means
extraordinary in the present situation. The opinion rested heavily upon
the proposition that the President was acting within his authority to
faithfully execute the laws of the land and was taking appropriate meas-
ures in a time of emergency to implement the Congressional intention
that the Korean conflict be pursued and defense of the nation be sus-
tained. The Congressional provisions for maintenance of industrial peace
had failed in this time of emergency when the union announced a strike
despite the efforts of the Wage Stabilization Board. While the authority
of Congress is supreme in this area, the President's actions were valid in
the emergency context unless repudiated by Congress.
59. Id. at 587-8.
60. Id. at 588.
61. Id. at 588-9.
Summary
What can be reasonably said to be the corpus of the Executive Power
doctrine in the wake of Youngstown Sheet and Tube? One commentator
answers this question succinctly:
Congress by vitrue of its legislative powers has the paramount au-
thority to prescribe procedures and programs to be followed in
meeting an emergency situation of this kind; whatever authority the
President may have by virtue of his office is subject to legislative
limitation. The dissenting judges, it should be emphasized, did not
assert the supremacy of executive prerogative over congressional legis-
lative authority. It is fair to conclude also that all the Court agreed
that the President's action could not be justified as an exercise of his
military power as Commander in Chief of the armed forces. Indeed,
the case should serve as a particularly valuable precedent in preclud-
ing an extensive interpretation of the President's autonomous military
powers as a basis for executive control of the internal economy when
the country is not in a state of declared war and not threatened withimminent invasion. Finally, the case shows a common area of agree-
ment in that the interpretations placed upon the President's powers are
based on the language of the Constitution, a common willingness to
accept the premise that the President's powers are delegated powers
and that the President's actions must be justified on the basis of the
grants of authority under Article II. The theory of inherent power
in the conduct of foreign affairs, advanced in the Curtiss-Wrigbt case
finds no echo in these opinions dealing with presidential powers re-
specting internal matters. In the end, the members of the court seem
pretty well agreed that whatever constitutional power the President
has to take action in a non-military situation, apart from specific
authorization by Congress, must rest on the general power stated in
section 3 of Article II that the President "shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed."
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THE FEDERAL NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE
The delegation of legislative power has been defined as "an attempt
by a legislature to amplicate its legislative power'by delegating to another
the power to enact a law, whether in form or effect, or to bestow upon
another the power to determine the effectiveness of a specific act." 63 The
classic statement of the federal non-delegation doctrine was pronounced
in the leading case of Field v. Clark: "That Congress cannot delegate
legislative power to. the President is a principle universally recognized
as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government
ordained by the Constitution. '6 4 This doctrine is "wholly judge-made." 6 5
Article I of the Constitution itself solely provides: "All legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States66 ...
(and) ...Congress shall have Power . . (to) make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers and all-other Powers vested by the Constitution in the Govern-
ment of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof. '6 7
62. Kauper, supra, note 1 at 176.
63. Ballantine's Law Dictionary 327 (3rd ed. 1969).
64. 143 U.S. 649,' 692 (1892).
65. K. Davis, Administrative Law Text 33 (1959) (hereinafter cited as Davis).
66. U.S. Const. art. 1, §1.
67. U.S. Const. art. 1, §8.
Delegation was not considered by the Constitutional Convention except
to defeat a proposal by Madison that the President be given power "to
execute such other powers .. as may from time to time be delegated by
the national legislature"68 as unnecessary. Though the non-delegation
doctrine has been restated as recently as 1932,"9 and apparently upheld
several years later in the famous Schecter "Sick Chicken" case, 70 the
Supreme Court since then has specifically upheld many delegations of
legislative power by Congress, and has not once struck down such delega-
tion to a regularly constituted administrative agency. 71 Before reaching
the Schecter controversy and the cases which follow, a brief look at the
development of the federal doctrine of non-delegability is in order.
The Developing Non-Delegation Doctrine
As pointed out above, the classic formation of the federal non-delega-
tion doctrine appeared in Field v. Clark.7 2 Congress had conferred on
the President the power to suspend by proclamation the introduction of
tea, molasses, coffee, sugar and hides into the United States from another
country when he was satisfied that any country producing such articles
imposed duties on American products which the President deemed "to
be reciprocally unequal and unreasonable. s73 The Court upheld this
deceptively simple direction as a sufficiently narrow directive to the
President as to effectively deprive him of any law-making function in-so-
far as the determination of "free list" foreign commodities were con-
cerned. In reality the President was given considerable practical latitude
in controlling imports from foreign nations in those commodities. This
fact notwithstanding, the Court delivered several broad generalizations,
first noting that "Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the
President,"'7 4 then going on to say that "[n]othing involving the ex-
pediency or the just operation of such legislation (The "Reciprocal
Treatment" Trade Statute) was left to the determination of the Presi-
dent ... He was the mere agent of the law-making department to ascer-
tain and declare the event upon which its expressed will has to take
effect." 75 The President was not acting as a lawmaker.
A more explicit grant to the Executive of the power "to make laws"
might be implied in Buttfield v. Stranaban,76 though the Supreme Court
disagreed. The Tea Inspection Act of March 2, 189777 made it unlawful
"to import or bring into the United States any merchandise as tea which
is inferior in purity, quality, and fitness for consumption" 78 and then
68. Davis, supra note 65 at 33.
69. "That the legislative power of Congress cannot be delegated is. of course, clear." United
States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Company, 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932).
70. A.L.A. Scheeter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
71. Davis, supra note 65 at 32.
72. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
73. Tariff of 1890, ch. 1244, §3, 26 Stat. 612.
74. 143 U.S. at 692.
75. Id. at 693.
76. 192 U.S. 470 (1903).
77. Ch. 358, 29 Stat. 604-5.
78. Id. §1.
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directed the Secretary of the Treasury to "fix and establish uniform
standards of purity, quality and fitness for consumption of all kinds of
teas imported into the United States."79 One of the appellant importer's
teas had been rejected by Federal Tea Inspectors because, in light of the
Treasury Secretary's regulations, they were "inferior to standard in
quality." The Court upheld the rejection and the statute because a
"primary standard" had been provided in that a proper construction of
the statute indicated an intention to exclude the lowest grades of tea,
for whatever reason they were inferior. Essential to the Court holding
here was probably its belief that "Congress legislated on the subject as
far as was reasonably practicable, and from the necessities of the case
was compelled to leave to executive officials the duty of bringing about
the result pointed out by the statute."8 0
In 1905 Congress empowered the Secretary of Agriculture8 l to make
provisions for the protection of public lands and reservations. He was
authorized to "make such rules and regulations and establish such service
as will ensure the objects of such reservation, namely, to regulate their
occupancy and use, and to preserve the forests thereon from destruc-
tion."8 2 Any violation of the Act, or such rules and regulations as were
promulgated under it, was a criminal offense meriting a maximum $500
fine or a maximum twelve months in prison, or both.8 3 As a result of
his authorization, the Secretary of Agriculture on June 12, 1906 issued
Regulation 45 requiring certain persons grazing cattle on public lands
to secure permits.8 4 In United States v. Grimaud,85 the defendants were
charged with driving and grazing sheep on a federal reserve without a
permit. Defendants claimed that Congress had delegated its power to
determine a federal crime to an executive official of the government.
The Court would not accept this line of reasoning, and upheld the Secre-
tary's Regulation with an opinion which in a certain sense further be-
fuddled the whole issue of delegability. The Court ". . . admitted, that it
is difficult to define the line which separates legislative power to make
laws, from administrative authority to make regulations. '8 6 Further the
Court asserted that "the authority to make administrative rules is not a
delegation of legislative power, nor are such rules raised from an ad-
ministrative to a legislative character because the violation thereof is
punished as a public offense."8 7 The inherent weaknesses of such an
assertion are apparent. Perhaps the principle to be taken from this case
is that the rule making function is delegable, provided that its operations
are limited. In reference to the making of the contended regulation, the
Court pointed out that the executive officers "did not go outside of the
79. Id. §3.
80. 192 U.S. at 496.
81. Act of February 1, 1905, ch. 288, §1. 33 Stat. 628.
82. Act of June 4, 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 35.
83. Rev. Stat., §5388 (1873).
84. 220 U.S. at 509 (citing text of "Regulation 45" promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture, June 12, 1906).
85. 220 U.S. at 509 (1911).
86. Id. at 517.
87. Id. at 521.
circle of that which the act itself had affirmatively required to be
done .. ."s8 Despite this advance, the Court had still not made clear
what limits there actually were on the authority to make administrative
rules granted the Executive.
In 1926, Chief Justice Taft speaking for the majority in Mahler v.
Eby8 9 upheld legislation allowing the Secretary of Labor to deport alien
"undesirable residents" who fell within certain classes of persons enum-
erated in the act.D0 Noting that past legislation and practice had given
the Secretary of Labor sufficient indicia of who were undesirable aliens,
the Chief Justice went on to say: "Our history has created a common
understanding of the words 'undesirable residents' which gives them a
quality of a recognized standard."91 In this momentary allusion to the
concept of a standard, Chief Justice Taft introduced the fundamental
principle upon which the present theories concerning limits of Congres-
sional delegation are based.
Four years later the Chief Justice took an opportunity to develop this
idea. The Flexible Tariff Act of 1922 provided in pertinent part:
... whenever the President, upon investigation of the difference in
costs of production of articles wholly or in part the growth or
product of the United States and of like or similar articles wholly or
in part the growth or product of competing foreign countries, shall
find it thereby shown that the duties fixed in this act do not equalize
the said differences in costs of production in the United States and
the principal competing country he shall, by such investigation, ascer-
tain said differences and determine and proclaim the changes in
classification or increases or decreases in any rate of duty provided
in this act shown by said ascertained differences in such costs of pro-
duction necessary to equalize the same .... Provided, That the total
increase or decrease of such rates of duty shall not exceed 50 per
centum of the rates specified in title 1 of this act, or in any amenda-
tory act. * * *That in ascertaining the differences in costs of production, under
the provisions of subdivisions (a) and (b) of. this section, the Presi-
dent, in so far as he finds it practicable, shall take into consideration
(1) the differences in conditions in production, including wages, costs
of material, and other items in costs of production of such or similar
articles in the United States and in competing foreign countries; (2)
the differences in the wholesale selling prices of domestic and foreign
articles in the principal markets of the United States; (3) advantages
granted to a foreign producer by a foreign government, or by a per-
son, partnership, corporation, or association in a foreign country;
and (4) any other advantages or disadvantages in competition. 92
The Congressional Act gave the President impressive powers, in that he
could virtually make a tax rate and thereby repeal the previous Con-
gressional determination. The general policy of the act was clear but as a
practical matter the mechanics of its application in a given situation could
allow the President, with a considerable modicum of validity, to come to
88. Id. at 518.
89. 264 U.S. 32 (1924).
90. Act of May 10, 1920, ch. 174, §1, 41 Stat. 593.
91. 264 U.S. at 40 (emphasis added).
92. Ch. 356, §315, 42 Stat. 941.
any politically advantageous conclusion he desired. 93 Furthermore, ex-
pediting the act was discretionary with the President, and he could ignore
the advice given him by the tarriff commission. Notwithstanding these
sharp objections, in J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States,94 the
Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the act saying: "If
Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to
which the person or body authorized to fix rates is directed to conform,
such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative
power." 95 Congressional delegations to be valid had to provide some
"intelligible principle" to guide and limit activity of the executive offi-
cer. In regard to the question of whether executive officers exercising
discretion in the conduct of delegated duties were actually acting as
lawmakers, the Court noted that an executive officer can act only after
the legislature has done the legislative act in empowering him, and then
went on to cite9 6 with approval the Supreme Court of Ohio:
The true distinction, therefore, is, between the delegation of power
to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what
it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execu-
tion, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done, to the latter no valid objection can be made.
9 7
This decision faintly suggests a principle which was soon to become
the first judicial attempt to reconcile the non-delegation doctrine with
decisions sustaining substantial delegation of legislative power. A the-
oretical attempt would be made to distinguish true legislative power and
its concommitant but subsidiary analogue in the realm of executive ad-
ministrative action-the idea that an executive administration merely
"filled up" the Congressional directive or acted as a fact finder in order
that the legislative policies might be carried out. This attempt was best
expressed in 1932 in the Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co. 9 8 case where
the Court declared: "But Congress may declare its will, and after fixing
a primary standard, devolve upon administrative officers the 'power to
fill up the details' by prescribing administrative rules and regulations."9 9
The "fill-up" doctrine was largely laid to rest within a decade as opinions
of the Supreme Court became more straight-forward concerning the mat-
ter. In 1940, with only one Justice dissenting, the Supreme Court stated:
"Delegation by Congress has long been recognized as necessary in order
that the exertion of legislative power does not become a futility."'100 In
that same decade the New Deal was desperately trying to pull the nation
out of the "Great Depression" and the Court decided the only two cases
it has ever handed down invalidating Congressional delegations to public
93. Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power, t7 Col L. Rev. 359, 361-2 n.
11 (1947).
94. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
95. Id. at 409 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 407.
97. Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesvllle Railroad Co. v. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 77, 88-9
(1852).
98. Unlttd States v. Shreveport Grain 6 Elevator, 287 U.S. 77 (1932).
99. Id. at 85.
100. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins. 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940).
authorities.
The Non-Delegation Doctrine Applied
The first denial of delegated Congressional power to the President
involved the reknowned "Hot Oil" case in 1935. Section 9(c) of the
National Industrial Recovery Act' 01 had authorized the President
... to prohibit the transportation interstate and foreign commerce of
petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from
storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or with.
drawn from storage by any State law or valid regulation or order
prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or other
duly authorized agency of a State .... 102
Section 9 of the NIRA had been designated by Congress as the "Oil
Regulation." Pursuant to Section 9(c), the President had approved a
"Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry," and designated
the Secretary of the Interior as administrator fully vested with the powers
of the President under 9(c) who in turn issued Regulations for enforce-
ment of the Code.'0 3 In Panama Refining Corp. v. Ryan,10 4 the appel-
lants appealed an order enjoining violations of both the "Petroleum
Code" of "fair competition" and the Regulations issued thereunder.1 05
"Plaintiffs attacked the validity of section 9(c) as an unconstitutional
delegation to the President of legislative power and as transcending the
authority of Congress under the commerce clause."' 10  Assuming without
deciding that Congress had power to interdict interstate commerce as
provided for in 9(c), the Court recognized that:
..the question whether that transportation shall be prohibited by
law is obviously one of legislative policy. Accordingly, we look to the
statute to see whether the Congress has declared a policy with respect
to that subject; whether the Congress has required any finding by
the President in the exercise of the authority to enact the prohibi-
tion. 0 7
Determined to take this tack, the Court proceeded to thoroughly examine
Title I of the NIRA for any declared congressional policy guidelines for
the President in respect to Section 9(c). Having gone through Section
9(c), 9(a) and 9(b), the Court turned to Section 1 where, in the Court's
words, it found a "general outline of policy"-that a national emergency
existed; that it was Congress's policy to remove all impediments to the
free flow of commerce, to prevent unfair competitive practices, to pro-
mote the fullest utilization of industry,. etc.-containing "nothing as to
the circumstances or conditions in which transportation of petroleum or
101. Ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195.
102. Id. at 9(c), 48 Stat. 200.
103. See text of opinion setting out the complex series of Executive Orders and authoriza-
tions accomplishing this end. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 405-10
(1935).
104. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (hereinafter cited as Panama).
105. Ryan v. Amazon Petroleum Corp., 71 F.2d 1 (1934); Ryan v. Panama Refining Com-
pany, 71 F.2d 8 (1934).
106. Panama, supra, note 104, at 411.
107. Id. at 415.
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petroleum products should be prohibited-nothing as to the policy of
prohibiting or not prohibiting the transportation of production exceeding
what the states allow." 108 Further investigation of Title 1 gave the Court
no reason to change this early finding, and remarks made at this stage
of the inquiry point up the bases of the subsequent holding:
The Congress did not declare in what circumstances that transporta-
tion should be forbidden, or require the President to make any
determination as to any facts or circumstances. Among the numerous
and diverse objectives broadly stated, the President was not required
to choose. The President was not required to ascertain and proclaim
the conditions prevailing in the industry which made the prohibition
necessary. The Congress left the matter to the President without
standard or rule, to be dealt with as he pleased. The effort by in-
genious and diligent construction to supply a criterion still permits
such a breadth of authorized action as essentially to commit to the
President the functions of a Legislature rather than those of an execu-
tive or administrative officer executing a declared legislative policy.
We find nothing in section 1 which limits or controls the authority
conferred by section 9(c).1 09
The Court went on to note both Article I Section 1 of the Constitution
vesting all legislative powers in Congress; and Article I Section 8 em-
powering Congress to make all necessary and proper laws for carrying
to execution its duties. The Court echoed the classic non-delegability doc-
trine saying "(t)he Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate or
to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is
thus vested." 110 The Court recognized that Congress of necessity must,
and could, deal flexibly with the complex conditions often encountered,
leaving to "selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules
within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the
policy as declared by the Legislature to apply."'' For purposes of this
discussion, the Court's decision was capped off several paragraphs later
when Chief Justice Hughes said:
•.. from the beginning of the government, the Congress has conferred
upon executive officers the power to make regulations-"not for the
government of their departments, but for administering the laws
which did govern!" United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517.
• ..Such regulations, become, indeed binding rules of conduct, but
they are valid only as subordinate rules and where found to be
within the framework of the policy which the Legislature has suffi-
ciently defined.112
Commentators seem to question whether this was truly a legitimate hold-
ing on the part of the Supreme Court. As one scholar put it: "The
Panama case involved a narrow power with a somewhat vague but recog-
nizable standard. It should have been upheld and probably would have
been if the Court had not been eager to chastise the New Deal's failings.
108. Id. at 417-8.
109. Id. at 418-9.
110. Id. at 421.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 428-9.
The decision,. however, does not raise an acute problem because the
alleged lack could be remedied with a few well chosen words to serve as
a standard. 113
The next case posed a far more fundamental application of the non-
delegability doctrine. In A.L.A. Scbecter Poultry Corp. v. United
States,1 14 the infamous "Sick Chicken" case, the Supreme Court unani-
mously held that Section 3 of the NIRA, authorizing the President to
approve or prescribe codes of "fair competition" was an unconstitution-
ally broad delegation of legislative power. 1 5 This case represents a con-
crete and direct application of the non-delegability doctrine to major
national legislation in a time of severe economic national emergency.
Writers question the present viability of the Schecter decision, 116 but it
stands as an unavoidable chapter in the history of Congressional delega-
tion. The standards in terms of expressed Congressional policy were the
same as in the Panama case, but the issues were different. The Panama
holding rested upon the vagueness of the Congressional standard. The
Schecter opinion went right to the heart of the matter. The Court found
that the Congress had exceeded its authority to delegate legislative power,
and the issue was the improper delegation itself.
Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act provided in part
that
Upon the application to the President by one or more trade or
industrial associations or groups, the President may approve a code
or codes of fair competition for the trade or industry or subdivision
thereof, represented by the applicant or applicants, if the President
finds (1) that such associations or groups impose no inequitable re-
strictions on admission to membership therein and are truly repre-
sentative of such trades or industries or subdivisions thereof, and
(2) that such code or codes are not designed to promote monopolies
or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not operate to
discriminate against them, and will tend to effectuate the policy of
this title: Provided, That such code or codes shall not permit monop-
olies or monopolistic practices: Provided further, That where such
code or codes affect the services and welfare of persons engaged in
other steps of the economic process, nothing in this section shall de-
prive such persons of the right to be heard prior to approval by the
President of such code or codes. The President may, as a condition of
his approval of any such code, impose such conditions (including re-
quirements for the making of reports and the keeping of accounts)
for the protection of consumers, competitors, employees, and others,
and in furtherance of the public interest, and may provide such ex-
ceptions to and exemptions from the provisions of such code, as the
President in his discretion deems necessary to effectuate the policy
herein declared."1
7
The legislative policy which was supposed to be effectuated by these
"codes" was set out in Section 1 of the NIRA:
113. Jaffe, Am Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power, 47 Col. L. Rev. 561, 573 (1947)
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114. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
115. Id. at 542.
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117. National Industrial Recovery Act. Ch. 30. §(a), 48 Stat. 196.
... A national emergency productive of widespread unemployment and
disorganization of industry, which burdens interstate and foreign
commerce, affects the public welfare, and undermines the standards
of living of the American people, is hereby declared to exist. it is
hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to remove obstructions
to the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce which tend to
diminish the amount thereof; and to provide for the general welfare
by promoting the organization of industry for the purpose of coopera-
tive action among trade groups, to induce and maintain united action
of labor and management under adequate governmental sanctions and
supervision, to eliminate unfair competitive practices, to promote the
fullest possible utilization of the present productive capacity of in-
dustries, to avoid undue restriction of production (except as may be
temporarily required), to increase the consumption of industrial and
agricultural products by increasing purchasing power, to reduce and
relieve unemployment, to improve standards of labor, and otherwise
to rehabilitate industry and to conserve natural resources.1 1 8
The "Live Poultry Code" was promulgated under Section 3, and peti-
tioners in Schecter were convicted of violating the Code and of con-
spiracy to do so. 11 The Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the con-
spiracy conviction and the conviction on sixteen counts for violation of
the Code, reversing conviction on two counts charging violation of re-
quirements as to minimum wages and maximum hours of work as these
were not within the congressional power of regulation. 120 In the lower
courts the defendants argued that: (1) the Code had been adopted pur-
suant to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power by Con-
griss; (2) that it attempted to regulate intrastate transactions beyond the
authority of Congress; (3) that in certain provisions it was repugnant
to the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 12 ' The Supreme Court
agreed with the petitioners that the delegation was in fact unconstitu-
tional,1 22 and that Congress did attempt regulation of intrastate affairs
as concerned the attempt to control wages and working hours in this
particular situation.1 23 In light of these holdings the Court felt it un-
necessary to consider the due process arguments.124 Present attention is
here properly focused upon the delegability question in isolation, because
the intrastate commerce question had no influence on the Court's finding
of unconstitutional delegation of Legislative power.
Turning to the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Hughes noted
early that the declared purpose of the "Live Poultry Code" was "(t)o
effect the policies of title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act.' 125
Counsel for the government urged that the provision of the statute
authorizing the creation of such codes be viewed in light of the "grave
national crisis."' 12 6 The Court answered this prayer by declaring:
118. Id. at §1, 48 Stat. 195.
119. United States r. Schecter, 8 F. Supp. 136 (1934).
120. United States v. A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp., 76 F.2d 617 (1935).
121. United States v. Schecter, 8 F. Supp. 136, 141-2 (1934); United States v. A.LA.
Schecter Poultry Corp., 76 F.2d 617, 620 (1935) (the court's opinions impiledly meet
an "intrastate commerce" type of argument, and expressly do address the question of
improper Congressional delegation).
122. A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935).
123. Id. at 550.
124. Id. at 551.
125. Id. at 523.
126. Id. at 528.
. . . Undoubtedly, the conditions to which power is addressed are
always to be considered when the exercise of power is challenged.
Extraordinary conditions may call for extraordinary remedies. But the
argument necessarily stops short of an attempt to justify action which
lies outside the sphere of constitutional authority. Extraordinary con-
ditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power. The Constitution
established a national government with powers deemed to be ade-
quate, as they have proved to be both in war and peace, but these
powers of the national government are limited by the constitutional
grants. Those who act under these grants are not at liberty to trans-
cend the imposed limits because they believe that more or different
power is necessary.1
2 7
Moving on to the more specific delegability question, the Court re-
viewed its reasoning in the Panama case-the legislative power and
responsibility for making all necessary and proper laws is vested in
Congress; Congress may adapt legislation to complex situations if done
without abdicating its legislative responsibility by laying down policies
and standards which selected instrumentalities fill out or determine the
application thereof to a particular fact situation; but the wide range of
already acceptable delegations must not "be allowed to obscure the limi-
tations of the authority to delegate .... ,127 Accordingly the Court deter-
mined to look to the statute in order to see whether Congress over-
stepped these limitations.
The problem was "whether Congress in authorizing 'codes of fair
competition' has itself established the standards of legal obligation, thus
performing its essential legislative function, or, by the failure to enact
such standards, has attempted to transfer that function to others."
128 The
Court also distinguished the present case from its predecessor Panama:
The aspect in which the question is now presented is distinct from
that which was before us in the case of the Panama Refining Com-
pany. There the subject of the statutory prohibition was defined....
(citation omitted) ...
... That subject was the transportation in interstate and foreign com-
merce of petroleum and petroleum products which are produced or
withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted by state
authority. The question was with respect to the range of discretion
given to the President in prohibiting that transportation .... (citation
omitted) . . .
... As to the "codes of fair competition," under sectibn 3 of the act,
the question is more fundamental. It is whether there is any adequate
definition of the subject to which the codes are to be addressed.130
Chief Justice Hughes criticized the lack of any definition of "fair com-
petition." Did it refer to any previous definition established by the law
or was it a convenient way to allow the President to designate its mean-
ing by whichever codes he prescribed or approved.
The common law recognized "Unfair Competition," a narrow con-
127. Id. at 528-9.
138. Id. at 530.
129. Id.
130. Id.
cept largely limited to business torts-fraud, misappropriation, misrepre-
sentation and the like. Such a definition obviously did not encompass
the objectives sought by the NIRA. The Federal Trade Commission Act
introduced the concept of "unfair methods of competition." The meaning
of this phrase was definitely broader in content than the analogous com-
mon law notion, but the precise meaning had to be found in context of a
particular fact situation. To do this Congress established a commission,
a quasi-judicial body, with provisions for all necessary administrative
protections.
In providing for codes, the National Industrial Recovery Act dis-
penses with this administrative procedure and with any administra-
tive procedure of an analogous character. But the difference between
the code plan of the Recovery Act and the scheme of the Federal
Trade Commission Act lies not only in procedure but in subject mat-
ter. We cannot regard the "fair competition" of the codes as anti-
thetical to the "unfair methods of competition" of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. The "fair competition" of the codes has a much
broader range and a new significance. 131
A statement of the authorized objectives and content of the "codes of
fair play" was supposedly found in the "Declaration of Policy" in Section
1, title 1 of the Recovery Act and according to Section 3 of the same
title, the approval of a code by the President was dependent upon his
finding that it "will tend to effectuate the policy of this title." Recogniz-
ing the broad sweep of Section 1 the Court maintained that
. .. the conclusion is inescapable that the authority sought to be
conferred by section 3 was not merely to deal with "unfair competi-
tive practices" which offend against existing law, and could be the
subject of judicial condemnation without further legislation, or to
create administrative machinery for the application of established
principles of law to particular instances of violation. Rather, the pur-
pose is clearly disclosed to authorize new and controlling prohibi-
tions through codes of laws which would embrace what the formu-
lators would propose, and what the President would approve or pre-
scribe, as wise and beneficient measures for the government of trades
and industries in order to bring about their rehabilitation, correction,
and development, according to the general declaration of policy in
section 1. Codes of laws of this act sort are styled "codes of fair
competition."13
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Mindful of this, Chief Justice Hughes returned to the idea that Con-
gress could not give the President "unfettered discretion to make what-
ever laws he thinks may be needed or advisable for the rehabilitation
and expansion of trade or industry."' 33 The Court then looked to the
Recovery Act to discover what real limitations had been put on the
President. There were none except that: (1) the approved codes could
not operate to promote monopolies or oppress small business; and (2)
trade or industrial groups proposing such codes had to be truly repre-
sentative imposing no inequitable restrictions on membership. The Court
131. Id. at 533-4.
132. Id. at 535.
133. Id. at 538.
found that such a sweeping delegation found no basis in past decisions
upon which the government relied and wrapped it all up by saying:
... Section 3 of the Recovery Act... [citation omitted] ... is with-
out precedent. It supplies no standards for any trade, industry, or
activity. It does not undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be
applied to particular states of fact determined by appropriate admin-
istrative procedure. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it au-
thorizes the making of codes to prescribe them. For that legislative
undertaking, section 3 sets up no standards, aside from the statement
of the general aims of rehabilitation, correction, and expansion de-
scribed in section 1. In view of the scope of that broad declaration
and of the nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the discre-
tion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus
enacting laws for the government of trade and industry throughout
the country, is virtually unfettered. We think that the code-making
authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power.'
3 4
For the immediate purpose of this discussion, the point to note is
that in the case of the NIRA's codes of "fair competition" there was no
"adequate definition of the subject to which the codes . . . (were) ...
addressed. 1 8 5 In the Panama case, section 9(c) at least defined the sub-
ject of the statutory prohibition (transportation of petroleum and pe-
troleum products), although it accorded the President unconstitutionally
broad discretion. Here in Schecter the case is different. Section 3 of the
Recovery Act doesn't really define "unfair competition" while authoriz-
ing the President to prescribe or approve far reaching Codes for the
prevention of it. The real pivotal fact in this decision was that the Presi-
dent could determine the very essential nature of the legislation by decid-
ing what its subject matter was. In reviewing the cases following Schecter,
a general drift will be seen away from the seemingly rigorous application
of the non-delegability doctrine in Schecter, but never will so broad a
delegation be seen, without giving the Chief Executive some more explicit
directions as to the very essential nature of the legislation.
Decline o the Classic Non-Delegation Doctrine
The Federal non-delegation doctrine enjoyed its greatest acceptance
during the 1930's as evidenced by the Panama and Scbecter decisions.
During the 1940's,- judicial reliance on the doctrine weakened and the
Court upheld delegations without real standards or intelligible principles.
The most recent history of the non-delegability doctrine has seen the
Court uphold cases of major administrative policy making without mean-
ingful statutory guidance, Today, commentators are beginning to recog-
nize that the non-delegability doctrine is largely a failure and are sug-
gesting its alteration and modified reemployment. Before reaching those
suggestions, however, it seems proper to first look back to 1943.
In National Broadcasting Company v. United States, '" the National
134. Id. at 541-2.
135. Id. at 531.
136. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
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Broadcasting Company decided to attack the validity of the Federal
Communications Commission's Chain Broadcasting Regulations. These
regulations were intended primarily to reach the major networks' monop-
olistic programming practices which the Commission found excluded the
listening public from programs produced by independent stations or
smaller networks. This attempted regulation "involved something clearly
beyond what was contemplated"'137 in 1934 when the Commission was
created 138 to license broadcasting stations. The enabling statute in part
provided that:
... the Commission from time to time, as public convenience, interest
or necessity requires, shall . . . (s)tudy new uses for radio, provide
for experimental uses of frequencies, and generally encourage the
larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest . . .139
The legislative history of the Act, and any reading thereof, yielded no
Congressional guidance as to the monopolistic practices the Commission's
Regulations were intended to reach. NBC in consequence maintained that
the Federal Communications Commission was attempting to exercise au-
thority not delegated to it. The Court replied that:
• . . The Act itself established that the Commission's powers are not
limited to the engineering and technical aspects of regulation of radio
communication. Yet we are asked to regard the Commission as a kind
of traffic officer, policing the wave lengths to prevent stations from
interfering with each other. But the Act does not restrict the Commis-
sion merely to supervision of the traffic. It puts upon the Commission
the burden of determining the composition of that traffic. The facili-
ties of radio are not large enough to accommodate all who wish to
use them. Methods must be devised for choosing from among the
many who apply. And since Congress itself could not do this, it
committed the task to the Commission.140
The Commission was given a touchstone in performing this duty-"public
interest, convenience, or necessity"-"a criterion 'which is as concrete as
the complicated factors for judgment in such a field of delegated au-
thority permit.' -141 The "public interest" to be served was the interest
of the listening public in "the larger and more effective use of radio."
In upholding the action of the Commission, the Supreme Court said its
duty was at an end when the Court found the action was based upon
findings supported by evidence and was made pursuant to authority
granted by Congress. It was not for the Court to say that the public
interest would be furthered or retarded by the regulations. This decision,
coming less than a decade after Schecter, clearly indicated a new, 're-
laxed" judicial disposition toward the delegation of Congressional
authority.
The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942142 provided for the estab-
lishment of the Office of Price Administration under the direction of a
137. Davis, supra note 65 at 33.
138. Communications Act of 1934. ch. 652, §1, 48 Stat. 1064.
139. Id. at §303(g), 48 Stat. 1082.
140. 319 U.S. at 215-6.
141. Id. at 216.
142. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23.
Price Administrator appointed by the President. The Act set up a
comprehensive scheme for the Administrator's promulgation of regula-
tions or orders fixing such maximum prices of commodities and rents as
would effectuate the Act's purposes and conform to the standards it
prescribed. The Act was created as a war time measure to expire on a
specified date unless sooner terminated by Presidential proclamation.
Section 1(a) read:
... It is hereby declared to be in the interest of the national defense
and security and necessary to the effective prosecution of the present
war, and the purposes of this Act are, to stabilize prices and to pre-
vent speculative, unwarranted, and abnormal increases in prices and
rents; to eliminate and prevent profiteering, hoarding, manipulation,
speculation, and other disruptive practices resulting from abnormal
market conditions or scarcities caused by or contributing to the na-
tional emergency; to assure that defense appropriations are not dissi-
pated by excessive prices; to protect persons with relatively fixed and
limited incomes, consumers, wage earners, investors, and persons de-
pendent on life insurance, annuities, and pensions, from undue impair-
ment of their standard of living; to prevent hardships to persons
engaged in business, to schools, universities, and other institutions,
and to the Federal, State, and local governments, which would result
from abnormal increases in prices; to assist in securing adequate pro-
duction of commodities and facilities; to prevent a post emergency
collapse of values; to stabilize agricultural prices in the manner pro-
vided in section 3; and to permit voluntary cooperation between the
Government and producers, processors, and others to accomplish the
aforesaid purposes.. 143
The Standards which were to guide the Administrator were set out in
Section 2(a):
Whenever in the judgment of the Price Administrator . . . the price
or prices of a commodity or commodities have risen or threaten to
rise to an extent or in a manner inconsistent with the purposes of this
Act, he may by regulation or order establish such maximum price or
maximum prices as in his judgment will be generally fair and equit-
able and will effectuate the purposes of this Act. So far as practicable,
in establishing any maximum price, the Administrator shall ascertain
and give due consideration to the prices prevailing'between October 1
and October 15, 1941... for the commodity or commodities included
under such regulation or order, and shall make adjustments for such
relevant factors as he may determine and deem to be of general ap-
plicability, including the following: Speculative fluctuations, general
increases or decreases in costs of production, distribution, and trans-
portation, and general increases or decreases in profits earned by
sellers of the commodity or commodities, during and subsequent to
the year ended October 1, 1941.
the statute went on to provide that the Administrator should, "so far as
practicable" consult with representatives of the industry effected, and
upon request of that industry, create a committee to make "recommenda-
tions" concerning price controls.
The petitioners in Yakus v. United States,145 were convicted of selling
143. Id. at §1(a), 56 Stat. 23-4.
144. Id. at §2(a), 56 Stat. 24-5.
145. 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
beef at prices above the maximum prescribed by the Administrator. They
challenged the Emergency Price Control Act as an unconstitutional dele-
gation of legislative power by Congress. The Court recognized that as
an emergency war measure Congress had constitutional authority to pre-
scribe commodity prices, and disagreed with the petitioners that the Act
was an unconstitutional delegation of its legislative power. The purposes
of the Act specified in Section 1 denoted the objective of the Admin-
istrator and the standards in Section 2 defined the boundaries within
which prices having those purposes were to be fixed. "It is enough to
satisfy the statutory requirements that the Administrator finds that the
prices fixed will tend to achieve that objective and will conform to those
standards . . .,"14 The Act was a proper Congressional exercise of its
legislative power. Congress stated an objective, prescribed the method
of achieving that objective, and laid down for the Administrator stand-
ards to guide his determination of when to exercise his power and the
particular prices to be established. The Court noted the NIRA and
distinguished it:
"The Act is unlike the National Industrial Recovery Act . . . (citation
omitted) . . . considered in Schecter Poultry Co. v. United States
... (citation omitted) .. . which proclaimed in the broadest terms its
purpose to 'rehabilitate industry and to conserve natural resources.'
It prescribed no method of attaining that end save by the establish-
ment of codes of fair competition, the nature of whose permissible
provisions was left undefined. It provided no standards to which those
codes were to conform.
Satisfied that the Emergency Price Control Act was a permissible exer-
cise of the National legislative power the Court sustained the petitioners
convictions.
In 1948 the Supreme Court sustained another large delegation of
Congressional power. The petitioners in Licbter v. United States,148 were
accused by the Undersecretary of War of realizing excess profits on
government procurement and construction contracts during World War
II in violation of the first Renegotiation Act.149 That Act basically au-
thorized government officials to recover "excessive profits" made by
government contractors without actually defining "excessive." In the
words of the statute:
• . . The Secretary of each Department is authorized and directed,
whenever in his opinion excessive profits have been realized, or are
likely to be realized, from any contract with such Department or from
any subcontract thereunder, (1) to require the contractor or sub-
contractor to renegotiate the contract price, (2) to withhold from the
contractor or subcontractor any amount of the contract price which is
found as a result of such renegotiation to represent excessive profits,
and (3) in case any amount of the contract price found as a result
of such renegotiation to represent excessive profits shall have been
paid to the contractor or subcontractor, to recover such amount from
146. Id. at 423.
147. Id. at 424.
148. 334 U.S. 742 (1948).
149. Renegotiation Act of 1942. ch. 247, §403, 56 Stat. 245.
such contractor or subcontractor . . .
. . . In renegotiating a contract price or determining excessive profits
for the purposes of this section, the Secretaries of the respective De-
partments shall not make any allowance for any salaries, bonuses, or
other compensation paid by a contractor to its officers or employees
in excess of a reasonable amount, nor shall they make allowance for
any excessive reserves set up by the contractor or for any costs in-
curred by the contractor which are excessive and unreasonable ...150
The petitioners offered~the defense that the statute on its face was an
unconstitutional delegation of Congressional power. The argument was
based on the claim that the Act's delegation of authority "carried with
it too slight a definition of legislative policy and standards."'151 The
determination of the meaning of "excessive profits" by an administra-
tive official was an exercise of the legislative power rather than a mere
exercise of administrative discretion under valid legislative authority. The
original Renegotiation Act contained no definition of excessive profits
but a later amendment defined them as "any amount of a contract or
subcontract price which is found as a resilt of negotiation to represent
excessive profits. 152 The Court construed this elusive definition as Con-
gressional approval of administrative practice before the amendment.
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The Court noted other sections of the first Renegotiation Act calling for
renegotiation clauses in future contracts over $100,000, if, in the "judg-
ment of the Secretary, the profits can be determined with reasonable
certainty."' 154 "This statement indicated a relationship between current
'excessive profits' and those which later might be determined with
'reasonable certainty.' "15 The Court also pointed out that the Secretary
was not to allow for unreasonable compensations, reserves or costs in
renegotiating a contract or determining excessive profits. Speaking for
the Court, Mr. Justice Burton declared:
•.. It is in the light of these statutory provisions and administrative
practices that we must determine whether the Renegotiation Act made
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. On the basis of
(a) the nature of the particular constitutional powers being employed,
(b) the current administrative practices later incorporated into the
Act and (c) the adequacy of the statutory term "excessive profits" as
used in this context, we hold that the authority granted was a lawful
delegation of administrative authority and not an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power.156
Having previously determined that the Renegotiation Act was a valid
exercise of Congress's war powers, the Court went on to recognize that
a grant of constitutional power implied the power of delegation sufficient
to effect its purposes.
This power [to delegate legislative authority] is especially signifi-
150. Id. at §403(c), 56 Stat. 245-6.
151. 334 U.S. at 774.
152. Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, 701(4)(A), 58 Stat. 79.
153. 334 U.S. at 774.
154. Renegotiation Act of 1942, ch. 247, §403(b). 56 Stat. 245.
155. 334 U.S. at 776.
156. Id. at 778.
cant in connection with constitutional war powers under which the
exercise of broad discretion as to methods to be employed may be
essential to an effective use of its war powers by Congress. The degree
to which Congress must specify its policies and standards in order
that the administrative authority granted may not be an unconstitu-
tional delegation of its own legislative power is not capable of pre-
cise definition. In peace or in war it is essential that the Constitution
be scrupulously obeyed, and particularly that the respective branches
of the Government keep within the powers assigned to each by the
Constitution. On the other hand, it is of the highest importance that
the fundamental purposes of the Constitution be kept in mind and
given effect in order that, through the Constitution, the people of
the United States may in time of war as in peace bring to the support
of those purposes the full force of their united action.15
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Taken together, the NBC, Yakus and Lichter cases characterized a
judicial turnabout which largely denied the judiciary's extreme position
in Panama and Schecter. It was becoming increasingly more obvious to
observers that the Supreme Court really did not intend all that those
two cases could imply. One contemporary commentator discussing the
Lichter holding has said:
. . Justice Burton's opinion holding the Act valid confirms the gen-
eral suspicion that the only two Supreme Court decisions which ever
invalidated delegations to the executive branch of the government
were probably wrong. The usual attitude of the Supreme Court is one
of great leniency toward the congressional effort to be articulate in
its command to the executive branch; and particularly where, as
here, it is difficult to be explicit the statute will be upheld.
1 58
This tendency to uphold statutes where it was difficult for Congress to
be explicit was at that time becoming manifestly obvious as the Court
began to uphold delegations without definite standards or "intelligible
standards," eventually allowing agencies to make determinations of major
policy without legislative guidance. Brief mention only will be made of
three early cases illustrating this development in order that attention can
be given to two very contemporary cases illustrating these principles in
modern practice.
Fahey v. Mallonee,159 involved the Home Owner's Loan Act of
1933160 which authorized the Federal Home Loan Bank to regulate the
reorganization, merger or liquidation of building and loan associations
with power to appoint the necessary conservator or receiver.
16 1 The Act
stated no standard, no policy, no intelligible- principle. Nonetheless, the
Court sustained the legislation because it involved mere regulation in a
well established field.
. . . The provisions are regulatory. They do not deal with unprece-
dented economic problems of varied industries. They deal with a
single type of enterprise and with the problems of insecurity and mis-
management which are as old as banking enterprise. The remedies
157. Id. at 778-9.
159. Frank, The United States Supreme court, 1947-48, 16 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1, 16 (1948).
159. 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
160. Home Owners Loan Act of 1933, ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128.
161. Id. at §5(d), 48 Stat. 133.
which are authorized are not new ones unknown to existing law to
be invented by the Board in exercise of a lawless range of power.
Banking is one of the longest regulated and most closely supervised
of public callings. It is one in which accumulated experience of super.
visors, acting for many states under various statutes, has established
well-defined practices for the appointment of conservators, receivers
and liquidators...
A discretion to make regulations to guide supervisory action in such
matters may be constitutionally permissible while it might not be
allowable to authorize creation of new crimes in uncharted fields.
16 2
In American Trucking Associations v. United States,163 appellants at-
tacked new rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission governing the
use of leased or exchanged equipment. These rules effectively prevented
"*trip leasing," a practice which allowed agricultural commodity carriers-
exempt from the Motor Carrier's Act' 64-to make a trip one way, then
temporarily lease the equipment to a regulated carrier so as to not
return empty. Appellants urged that nowhere in the Act was there an
expressed delegation of power to control, regulate or affect leasing
practices and in no separate provision of the Act was there a direct
implication of such power. The Court agreed, but upheld the Commis-
sion's action because it bore a reasonable relationship to the regulatory
scheme of the Motor Carrier's Act. In defending its position the Court
declared:
- . . As a matter of principle, we might agree with appellants' conten-
tions if we thought it a reasonable canon of interpretation that the
draftsmen of acts delegating agency powers, as a practical and realistic
matter, can or do include specific consideration of every evil sought
to be corrected. But no great acquaintance with practical affairs is
required to know that such prescience, either in fact or in the minds
of Congress, does not exist. . . (citations omitted) . . . Its very
absence, moreover, is precisely one of the reasons why regulatory
agencies such as the Commission are created, for it is the fond hope
of their authors that they bring to their work the expert's familiarity
with industry conditions which members of the delegating legislatures
cannot be expected to possess. 165
In that same year the Supreme Court suggested the idea that administra-
tive agencies could, and in some situations should, make major policy
decisions on the basis of their own judgments rather than those they
suppose to be of Congress. The case was Federal Communications Com-
mission v. R.C.A. Communications, Inc.,' 60 where the Radio Corporation
of America challenged the FCC's granting of a license to a public-service
international radio telegraph carrier who would operate in competition
with RCA Communications' existing facilities. The Communications Com-
mission granted the license on the basis of the "national policy in favor
162. 332 U.S. at 250.
163. 344 U.S. 298 (1953).
164. Interstate Commerce Act. Part IL ch. 498. 1201, 49 Stat. 543. as amended, cb. 722,
§15, 54 Stat. 919.
165. 344 U.S. at 309-10.
166. 346 U.S. 86 (1953).
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of competition"1  because it was."reasonably feasible"' 0 8 to have both
radio telegraph companies operating. The Court reminded the FCC that
its actions were to be based upon what it found to be in the "public
interest, convenience, or necessity" 10 9 and noting that "(t)he Commission
... seems to have relied almost entirely on its interpretation of national
policy" 170 the Court found that
... it is improper for the Commission to suppose that the standard
it has adopted is to be derived without more from a national policy
defined by legislation and by -he courts. Had the Commission clearly
indicated that it relied on its own evaluation of the needs of the in-
dustry rather than on what it deemed a national- policy, its order
would have a different foundation ...To say that national policy
without more sufficies for authorization of a competing carrier where
ever competition is reasonably feasible would authorize the Commis-
sion to abdicate what would seem to us one of the primary duties
imposed on it by Congress .. .We think it not inadmissible for the
Commission, when it makes manifest that in so doing it is con-
scientiously exercising the discretion given it by Congress, to reach
a conclusion whereby authorizations would be granted wherever com-
petition is reasonably feasible. This is so precisely because the exer-
cise of its function gives it accumulating insight not vouchasafed to
courts dealing episodically with the practical problems involved in
such determination.171
The force of the decision was that in considering this matter the Commis-
sion should have considered its function free of specific legislative guid-
ance by Congress. The FCC failed in that its ". . . conclusion was not
based on the Commission's own judgment but rather on the unjustified
assumption that it was Congress's judgment that such authorizations are
desirable." 17 2 These fleeting references should point up the Supreme
Court's changed attitude toward delegations which during the 1930's
might have been received with hostility. Not only could administrators
in the appropriate circumstances operate without expressed Congres-
sional direction, but in addition were sometimes expected to take the
initiative in developing policies where their Congressional mandate
seemed to demand it. These basic principles, though no longer really
novel, govern administrative practice today. The question of unconstitu-
tional delegation, if raised in litigation, barely troubles the Supreme
Court. The first case following will illustrate a modern Congressional
delegation without a standard or "intelligible principle," while the last
will illustrate major policy making by an executive agency, the FPC.
Contemporary Non-Delegation
State of Arizona v. State of California17 3 involved a dispute between
those states coricerning the proper apportionment of the waters in the
167. Id. at 89.
168. Id. at 88.
169. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, §303, 48 Stat. 1082.
170. 346 U.S. at 91.
171. Id. at 94-6.
172. Id. at 96.
173. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
mainstream Colorado River. The controversy was controlled' 74 by the
Boulder Canyon Project Act of 192817. and the essential questions be-
came: (1) the validity of the original apportionment by the Secretary of
the Interior; and (2) the validity of any future apportionment by the
Secretary in case of water shortage. The southwestern water controversy
was one of old and immense proportions. Control of the now low and
tomorrow rampaging Colorado River was the key to the development of
seven southwestern states"76 during the early twentieth century. Not-
withstanding the obvious benefits of cooperation, these states could never
agree on any cooperative project to deal with the River. The involved
area could be roughly divided into an Upper Basin Area and a Lower
Basin Area (itself comprising California, Nevada and Arizona). Faced
with the problem, Congress passed the Project Act whereby the U.S.
government would sponsor the extensive facilities necessary to tame the
Colorado if the seven states involved properly ratified the Colorado
River Compact, agreeing irrevocably to join together in this project.
The Compact guaranteed the three Lower Basin states 7,500,000 acre-feet
of water yearly, but required that California agree never to demand more
than 4,400,000 acre-feet per year from that amount and never more
than one half of the excess. Debate before passage of the bill indicated
that of the water going to the Lower Basin Area, Arizona would need
4,400,000 acre-feet and Nevada only 300,000. The Act therefore con-
tained a clause empowering California, Arizona and Nevada to make a
private compact among themselves dividing the 7,500,000 acre-feet avail-
able to the Lower Basin in the following proportions: 4,400,000, 2,800,-
000 and 300,000 acre-feet respectively. 177 This agreement was to become
binding on ratification of the Colorado River Compact.
178 The Compact
was properly ratified and California agreed to its 4,400,000 primary
limit.179 The Lower Basin states did not, however, join in the optional
compact suggested by Congress. These matters accomplished, the rest of
the Boulder Canyon Project became operative. Section 8(b) of the Act
had allowed the Basin states to freely create another compact satisfactory
to themselves, concerning the use of waters accruing to the states and
subsidiary to the Colorado River Compact.18 0 This compact was to have
Congressional approval by January 1, 1929 or thereafter be always
"subject to all contracts, if any, made by the Secretary of the Interior
under Section 5 hereof prior to the date of such approval by Congress." 1 8'1
As with the previous optional compact, the Lower Basin states chose not
to reach agreement. Therefore, on the completion of Boulder Dam, the
Secretary of the Interior made contracts with various water users in
California for 5,362,000 acre-feet, with Nevada for 300,000 acre-feet
174. Id. at 551-2.
175. Ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057.
176. 373 U.S. at 552-4.
177. Boulder Canyon Project Act, Ch. 42, §4(a), 45 Stat. 
1059 (hereinafter cited as
Project Act).
178. Id.
179. 373 U.S. at 561-2.
180. Project Act at §7(b), 45 Stat. 1062.
181. Id.
and with Arizona for 2,800,000 acre-feet. The Secretary was purporting
to act under the authority of the Project Act. Section 5 of that Act
authorized the Secretary to
• . . contract for the storage of water in said reservoir and for the
delivery thereof at such points on the river and on said canal as may
be agreed upon . . . Contracts . . . shall be for permanent service
. . . no person shall have or be entitled to have the use for any pur-
pose of the water stored . . . except by contract made as herein
stated.182
In the absence of the compacts suggested by Congress, the Secretary had
to exercise his Section 5 powers, contracting away the 7,500,000 acre-feet
of water available to the Lower Basin. This amounted to an actual appor-
tionment of the mainstream waters entering that area. Arizona's suit
raised the question of the validity of this apportionment because Section
5 allegedly provided no standard for the exercise of this power delegated
to the Secretary by Congress. On its face, the argument seemed fair.
The Court disagreed and held that the Secretary of the Interior's
contracts with Arizona for 2,800,000 acre-feet of River water and with
Nevada for 300,000 acre-feet, together with the limitation of California
to 4,400,000 effected a valid apportionment of the first 7,500,000 acre-
feet of mainstream water in the Lower Basin. Viewing the legislative
history of the Act and reading the "persuasive" Sections 5 and 8(b) the
Court concluded that Congress intended the Secretary to apportion the
waters through his §5 contracts. Answering the question of improper
delegation for lack of sufficient standards, the Court said:
The argument that Congress would not have relegated to the Secre-
tary so much power to apportion and distribute the water overlooks
the ways in which his power is limited and channeled by standards in
the Project Act. In particular, the Secretary is bound to observe the
Act's limitation of 4,400,000 acre-feet in California's consumptive
uses out of the first 7,500,000 acre-feet of mainstream water. This
necessarily leaves the remaining 3,100,000 acre-feet for the use of
Arizona and Nevada, since they are the only other States with access
to the main Colorado River. Nevada consistently took the position,
accepted by the other States throughout the debates, that her con-
ceivable needs would not exceed 300,000 acre-feet, which of course,
left 2,800,000 acre-feet for Arizona's use. Moreover, Congress indi-
cated that it thought this a proper division of the waters when in the
second paragraph of §4(a) it gave advance consent to a tri-state
compact adopting such division. While no such compact was ever
entered into, the Secretary by his contracts has apportioned the water.
in the approved amounts and thereby followed the guidelines set
down by Congress.' 8 8
The Court noted that there were other "significant" limitations and
standards in the Secretary's power to distribute stored water-river regu-
lation, flood control, river navigation, irrigation and domestic uses,
satisfaction of present perfected rights, power, revenue, etc.
182. Project Act at 5, 45 Stat. 1060.
183. 373 U.S. at 583-4.
Still, however, another question remained. What should be done in a
time of shortage? Did the Secretary have to make a pro rata sharing of
the water among the three states? The Supreme Court thought not. The
Secretary was vested with considerable control over the apportionment
of the River's waters, and "[w] hile the Secretary must follow the stand-
ards set out in the Act, he nevertheless is free to choose among the
recognized methods of apportionment or to devise reasonable methods
of his own. This choice as we see it, is primarily his, not ... ours."'
4
There was a strong dissent by three Justices, especially to the prop-
osition that the Secretary could apportion in times of shortage as he saw
fit. The dissenters felt that there was no real limitation on an immense
amount of the Secretary's' authority. Citing Schecter, Panama, and Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube, the dissent declared: "The delegation of such unre-
strained authority to an executive official raises, to say the least, the
gravest constitutional doubts."'1 5 Despite the dissent's strong language,
the six Justices of the majority clearly held that the Congressional dele-
gation was valid.
The Permian Basin rate case '! is another modern controversy illus-
trating the relative contemporary weakness of the non-delegation doc-
trine. As was noted earlier, the Supreme Court since Schecter has sus-
tained major policy decisions made by the executive without statutory
guidance, as well as delegations without meaningful standards. Such
policy making is often tantamount to executive law making, and occurs
today generally when older agencies are confronted with new economic
conditions or novel business practices not known or foreseen at the time
the agency was created. The obvious question is, do the agencies have
the power to deal with these new considerations without further Con-
gressional guidance. The Supreme Court has held that they do,' 8 ' often
in face of the fact that the agency itself for years considered itself not
empowered to do what it finally decided it had to do.' In Re Permian
Basin Area Rate Casesi s9 is a good example of an agency assuming new
functions not apparently required or authorized by an enabling statute.
The Federal Power Commission was created by Congress in 1920.10
The Natural Gas Act' 9 1 empowered the Commission to regulate the
transportation and sale of gas in interstate commerce but it did not
"... apply to ... the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities
used for such distribution or to the production or gathering of natural
gas."'192 In other words, the Act's specific provisions did not apply to
producers or well-head sales of natural gas. Accordingly, until the
Supreme Court's decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin,193 the
184. Id. at 593.
185. Id. at 626.
186. In Re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases. 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
187. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); American Trucking
Associations, Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka 6 Santa Fe Railway, 387 U.S. 397 (1967).
188. Id.
189. 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
190. Federal Water Power Act, ch. 285, §1, 41 Stat. 1063.
191. Ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821.
192. Id. at §1(b).
193. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
FPC had assumed that it had no power to regulate those activities. The
Court held to the contrary. The legislative history, past decisions and the
statutes language lead the Court to the decision that such a producer or
vender was a "natural gas company" within the meaning of the term as
defined by the Natural Gas Act.19 4 Before the decision the Commis-
sion's duties were fairly straightforward and of manageable proportions.
Thereafter the administrative task became complex and immense. Section
5(a) provides in part:
Whenever the Commission . . . shall find that any rate, . . . charged
... by any natural gas company in connection with any transportation
or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion . . . is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or prefer-
ential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable
rate .... 195
Where the FPC was formerly regulating only the rates of "natural gas
companies" actually transporting gas interstate, producer and well head
sales now had to be supervised. In addition, the traditional "costs of
service" type rate-making was largely inappropriate for gas producers,
since Gas producers are not really public utilities, in that they have no
franchises or guaranteed areas of service. They are intensely competitive
vendors of a wasting commodity often discovered after expensive and
sometimes unrewarded research; their unit costs rise and fall with for-
tune; their capital input is often not matched by a constant quality or
quantity output. Applying the "costs of service" type of rate analysis
to each individual producer was a prohibitive burden on the Commis-
sion's resources. By 1960 the FPC's resources had so broken down that
it announced proceedings by which it would determine maximum pro-
ducers' rates for each major producing area. The Commission did in
fact eventually put into effect a national scheme of area rate regulation.
The Permian Basin was such a rate area, and the appellants challenged
the Power Commission decision. There were several issues in controversy,
but the pertinent one for purposes of this discussion was: Did the Com-
mission have the ". . . statutory and constitutional authority to employ
area regulation. . . .,,1 In other words could the FPC ". . . regulate
producers' interstate sales by the prescription of maximum area rates,
rather than by proceedings conducted on an individual producer basis. 19 7
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court first examined several
interrelated considerations not leading directly to its decision on the
delegation issue, but of interest in the context of Congressional au-
thority to create and delegate power to enforce price controls. The Court
pointed out that Congressional price ceilings do not per se violate the
Constitution: -
It is plain that the Constitution does not forbid the imposition, in
194. Id. at 677.
195. Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 823.
196. 390 U.S. at 767-8.
197. Id. at 768.
appropriate circumstances, of maximum prices upon commercial and
other activites. A legislative power to create price ceilings has, in
"counries where the common law prevails," been "customary from time
immemorial.. ." (citation omitted).... Its exercise has regularly been
approved by this Court . . . (citations omitted) . . . No more does the
Constitution prohibit the determination of rates through group or
class proceedings. This Court has repeatedly recognized that legisla-
tures and administrative agencies may calculate the rates for a reg-
ulated class without first evaluating the separate financial position of
each member of the class .... 198
Furthermore, there is no constitutional objection where certain higher
cost producers are more adversely affected by a maximum price or
where the value of regulated property is reduced in consequence of the
regulation. Regulation can also constitutionally limit the return on a
capital investment. Price control is "unconstitutional . . . if arbitrary,
discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is
free to adopt . . ."199 (citation omitted). Nonetheless, the just and
reasonable standards of the Natural Gas Act met with the applicable
constitutional standards. Any reasonable rate could not be attacked as
confiscatory, and in calculating rates, the FPC could take into considera-
tion all of the interests Congress commissioned it to reconcile (consumer,
investor, etc.). The opinion clearly indicated that Congressional price
controls are constitutional, and Congress can delegate the power to
create them.
Returning directly to the Court's treatment of the delegation issue,
the question became whether, despite the absence of any constitutional
deficiency, area regulation was inconsistent with the terms of the Natural
Gas Act. The Court thought not; 2 00 through the national power over
interstate commerce, Congress intended to create an agency for regulating
the wholesale distribution of gas moving interstate to public service
companies. It was proper, the Court found, for the Commission to
balance investor and consumer interests. The Court noted that it
.. . has repeatedly held that the width of administrative authority
must be measured in part by the purposes for which it was con-
ferred . . . (citations omitted) . . . the Commission's broad responsi-
bilities therefore demand a generous construction of its statutory
authority .. . "legislative discretion implied in the rate making power
necessarily extends to the entire legislative process, embracing the
method used in reaching the'legislative determination as well as that
determination itself . . ." (citations omitted) . . . (R)ate making
agencies ... are permitted, unless their statutory authority otherwise
plainly indicates, to make the pragmatic adjustments which may be
called for by particular circumstances. 2 0 1
Since achieving the FPC's statutory objectives may depend upon more
expeditious administrative methods than theretofore employed, considera-
tions of feasibility and practicality were "certainly germane" to the issue
198. Id. at 768-9.
199. Id. at 769-70 (citation omitted).
200. Id. at 777.
201. Id. at 776-7.
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in question. The Court therefore could not . . . conclude that Congress
has given authority inadequate to achieve with reasonable effectiveness
the purposes for which it has acted."
' 20 2
The Arizona and Permian Basin cases are modern illustrations of the
non-validity of the federal non-delegation doctrine today. The Supreme
Court decisions after Schecter have approved delegation involving no
real standards, and have allowed broad policy making by agencies. As
noted earlier, the doctrine is basically judicially-derived, and the Supreme
Court seems willing to let it pass largely unnoticed. Justice Douglas'
dissent in Arizona stated that preventing undue delegation of power
kept major societal policy decisions in the hands of legislators who are
responsive to the people, as well as set meaningful standards for judicial
review.2 03 These benefits are probably illusory. As Professor Davis has
pointed out-after discussing early pre-Field2o4 delegations without
standards:
Qf course, today's governmental undertakings are much more com-
plex and the need for delegated power without meaningful standards
is much more compelling. A modern regulatory agency would prob-
ably be an impossibility if power could not be delegated with vague
standards. Typically, a regulatory agency must decide many major
questions that could not have been anticipated at the time of the
satutory enactment; typically, legislators are unable to write mean-
ingful standards that will be helpful in answering such major ques-
ions; and typically, the protections lie much less in standards than in
frameworks of procedural safeguards plus executive, legislative, or
judicial checks.
20 5
In reference to the Supreme Courts' 1932 statement in Shreveport: "That
the legislative power of Congress cannot be delegated is, of course,
clear" 200-Professor Davis observes:
The 1932 statement was an anachronistic statement of an earlier
attitude. The later purpose, already well along in its life cycle, was
to require meaningful standards when power was delegated: "Con-
gress cannot delegate any part of its legislative power except under
the limitation of a prescribed standard." . . . (citation omitted)
... The doctrine has clearly failed to accomplish this later pur-
pose.2
07
Professor Davis has suggested that the real focus of judicial attention
should be on the safeguards against abuse of administrative discretion
regardless of whether the statutory authority provides clear standards.
20 8
Congress in experience has been allowed, and undoubtedly will be al-
lowed to delegate its law making authority. Any real challenge to the
exercise of d legated authority in the future will probably be based upon
the approacli suggested by Davis. Though not herein discussed, the
202. Id. at 777.
203. State of Arizona y. State of California, 373 U.S. at 626 (1963).
204. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
205. K. Davis. Administrative Law Treatise 47 (1970 Supp.) (hereinafter cited as Admin-
istrative Law).
206. United States v. Shreveport Grain 4S Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932).
207. Administrative Law, supra note 205 at 42.
208. Id. at 40-1. 50-8.
Permian Basin case contains some good examples of challenges to the
administrative function itself.2 09 Any direct challenge to the delegation
of Congressional power would in all likelihood be a futile exercise.
CONCLUSION
Youngstown Sheet & Tube seemed to make clear that the theory of
inherent Executive power in the conduct of foreign affairs, has found
no favor in the Supreme Court opinions dealing with Presidential powers
respecting internal affairs. In domestic matters the President's supposed
authority to act must be based upon some power granted him by Article
II of the Constitution. Any domestic action that he takes, apart from a
military situation and without specific authorization from Congress,
must be in some way based upon his general Article 11, Section 3 duty
to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."
The series of decisions following Schecter, especially the most re-
cent, seem to largely indicate a judicial abandonment of the classical
Congressional non-delegation doctrine. The Supreme Court today has
evidently determined that the doctrine really is not functional. Broad
delegations to Executive officers without meaningful standards are con-
stitutionally acceptable, and likewise are major policy-making activities
of Executive instrumentalities. Congress can clearly, within liberal limits,
delegate its law-making function to the President.
In light of the foregoing conclusions, and considering the extensive
discussion above, it is highly unlikely that any challenge to the Economic
Stabilization Act of 1970 would be successful on the basis of an un-
constitutional delegation of legislative authority. One commentator in
1947 thought that Schecter might serve as a constitutional bar to exces-
sive delegation in the event of peacetime economic planning,210 but the
decisions since then largely belie such an assertion. Schecter might not
be an anachronism, but there seems to be no good reason to believe
otherwise.
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